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Wendy J. Gordon**
Philip S. Beck Professor of Law
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PROFESSOR KATYAL: Hello, everyone. I want to thank all of you for
coming today and for spending time with us today and tomorrow. I want
specifically to acknowledge the incredible work that our conference
organizers have done. Katherine Strandburg, Brett Frischmann, and Jay
Kesan have done such a wonderful job in putting together this incredibly
groundbreaking program, with so many interesting and wonderful papers
and participants.
Today I actually have the distinct honor of introducing someone who,
quite literally, needs no introduction. We have all read, cited, admired, and
have been enriched by the person that I am about to introduce to you.

* Her speech and essay are Copyright © 2009 by Wendy J. Gordon. Permission is granted
to make and distribute copies of her essay noncommercially provided this permission notice
is preserved on all such copies. In addition, of course, fair use remains available.
** Wendy J. Gordon is the Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of
Law. During the period of revising the speech for publication, she served as the BaconKilkenny Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law.
I owe great thanks to the participants at the Fordham conference. Many of the points
they raised in questions and comments have been incorporated into the essay you see before
you. I also apologize to those in the audience who wouldn’t describe themselves as I
described the group; I probably overstated the unanimity within the audience.
I particularly want to thank Marc Poirier, Gregg Macey, Jeannie Fromer, Andrew
Kull, and James Grimmelmann for stimulating discussion and providing helpful suggestions.

2411

GORDON 4.3.09

2412

4/6/2009 3:18:55 PM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

All of you know that Wendy Gordon is one of the most cited women in
intellectual property today. All of you also know that her work has brought
us consistently to a new level of thinking in terms of blending the insights
of philosophy, economics, and political theory into rethinking some of the
foundational presumptions that explain the design and the enforcement of
intellectual property. Her article, Fair Use as Market Failure,1 which was
on the Sony2 decision in the U.S. Supreme Court, ranks as one of the most
cited articles in intellectual property history. She has been cited in three
Supreme Court opinions,3 and I am sure she has influenced dozens more in
the process.4
You also probably know that Wendy Gordon holds a distinguished chair
at Boston University. She has also served as a Fulbright Scholar, a fellow
at Oxford, St. John’s College, a resident at the Rockefeller Foundation, and
has received a New Jersey Governor’s Fellowship in the Humanities. In the
spring, we are delighted to have her with us here at Fordham.
We know most of these incredible qualities and accomplishments, but
perhaps one thing that we particularly want to draw attention to is
something that so many of us in the room have benefited from.
As most of you know, the law of intellectual property is a relatively new
field. It is populated by some extremely successful men and women who
occupy very influential positions in the scholarly literature and also in the
judiciary. But one of the reasons why intellectual property as a discipline is
so special is because of the hard work that our world of senior scholars and
so many people in this room, like Pam Samuelson, Rochelle Dreyfuss,
Jonathan Zittrain, Graeme Dinwoodie, Joel Reidenberg, Keith Aoki, Jay
Kesan, Mike Madison—and there are so many others—have done in
making sure that younger generations of scholars get mentored and
supported and looked after as they develop.
So while you may know Wendy Gordon’s incredible accomplishments, I
want to draw your attention to some of the reasons why the world of
intellectual property—and particularly because of her—is such a special
and such a supportive field. She has been referred to by Pam Samuelson as
a pioneer in the field of intellectual property in many ways, including by
bringing important insights from other disciplines to bear on fundamental
issues in copyright law. She draws not just from economics, but also from
philosophy, art, literature, and psychology.

1. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
2. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984).
3. N.Y. Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 497 (2001); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559, 566 n.9 (1985); Sony, 464 U.S. at 478.
4. Wendy has been included in many “top citations” lists. For example, James
Lindgren and Donald Seltzer ranked Wendy as number five nationally on the list of “The
Most Prolific Law Professors in the 10 and 20 Most-Cited Law Reviews (Volumes
Beginning in 1988–1992) (Mean Pages).” James Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most
Prolific Law Professors and Faculties, 17 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 781, 800 tbl.9 (1996).
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“What exuberance,” Pam says, “she also brings to our field. It makes
copyright law that much more fun to have her with us.”
Her dean, Maureen O’Rourke, has said of Wendy, “It has been a
wonderful gift to be on the same faculty with Wendy Gordon,” and notes
that Wendy is not only generous with her time, but has also served as a
terrific mentor for junior faculty, both in the intellectual property field and
outside.
Feminist law professor and intellectual property maven Ann Bartow says,
“In addition to being brilliant and funny, Wendy is also a truth teller. She
does not tell social lies to stroke egos. She says exactly what she thinks,
and that’s a great attribute in a person.” Bartow explains, “She’s never
mean, but she’s always direct and forthright. For that reason, when she
gives you a compliment, it really means something special.”
If you have seen Wendy interact with her students or other scholars, or if
you have seen her run down the hall after someone insisting that they wear
a hat on a rainy day (which actually happened to me), you know precisely
what I’m talking about. You know how warm, how special, and how
generous she can be with others.
So I wanted to introduce Wendy not just by talking about her
accomplishments, which we all know, but by emphasizing how much her
time and generosity to others, on its own and by simply serving as an
example, has really transformed the way that intellectual property scholars
relate to one another.
As Stacey Dogan from Northeastern explained to me,
When I first met Wendy, I knew her only by her fearsome reputation as a
copyright superstar. The first couple of times I saw her at workshops, I
sort of cowered. Her comments seemed so intellectual and philosophical
and robust and intimidating. In fact, I don’t even think I dared to speak to
her for several months after joining the Boston area intellectual property
community. But one day just out of the blue, she invited me to lunch. I
was surprised and delighted to find her warm, disarming, and eager to talk
to me about my just-budding scholarly agenda. Since then, I have had
countless lunches with Wendy, working through her ideas and mine,
shooting most of them down, but honing, developing, and strengthening
many others.

I just want to end with an observation: what makes intellectual property
law such a special field is precisely people like Wendy, people who spend
time with junior folks working through intellectual property ideas and
helping to develop them. Jessica Silbey from Suffolk reminds us that,
Wendy thoroughly engages with your work and she responds with a deep
structural critique and genuine enthusiasm, both signs of respect. For a
junior scholar like myself, the attention Wendy provides is humbling.
And because she knows no status in her comments or attention, anyone
can be the beneficiary of it. In this way, she is a true intellectual, but she
is also a model citizen.
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I want to draw attention to this aspect of Wendy’s work because, in the
eyes of myself and so many others here, that is what makes her special, and
it is what makes intellectual property law as a field so special—that she
knows no status in her comments or attention, as Jessica says, and that is
what makes not just a true intellectual, but also a model citizen for us to
follow.
Let’s all give a warm welcome to the charming, humble, and inestimably
generous Wendy Gordon, and thank her for sharing her views with us.
PROFESSOR GORDON:
That was actually the kindest, nicest
introduction anyone has given for me in my entire life. Thank you so
much, Sonia.
I also want to thank Bill Treanor and Joel Reidenberg as our hosts, and to
thank Kathy Strandburg, Brett Frischmann, and Jay Kesan for putting this
excellent conference together. I also thank this morning’s panelists for
what I have already learned today, and I look forward to the rest of the
conference.

HARMLESS USE:
GLEANING FROM FIELDS OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS
I will first provide a brief comment about what I think brings us all
together. Second, I will talk about a particular project—something that has
preoccupied me ever since I entered the field—namely, the distinction
between what I will call, for sake of abbreviation, harmful use and harmless
use.
I. OUR COMMUNITY
Now to my first task. One of the interests that unify many of the scholars
in this room is a curiosity about noncommercial models such as cooperative
sharing and peer-to-peer creativity. Motivating this curiosity might be a
yearning for a different kind of society, perhaps one that is less commercial,
more focused on dialogues, both democratic and personal, and a mode of
life that emphasizes the process and product of work rather than its
monetary payoff.
We all know from the work of psychologists like Teresa Amabile5 and
education experts like Alfie Kohn,6 as well as from our own experience,

5. See, e.g., TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT: UPDATE TO THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY 149–52, 157–60 (1996) (finding that individuals promised a
reward for drawing produced more drawings than students not so motivated, but that the
“reward” group’s drawings were of lesser quality than the artwork produced spontaneously
by the control group).
6. See, e.g., ALFIE KOHN, PUNISHED BY REWARDS?: THE TROUBLE WITH GOLD STARS,
INCENTIVE PLANS, A’S, PRAISE, AND OTHER BRIBES (1993).
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that unprodded work is often the best work. External motivators, whether
sticks or carrots, can get in the way.
Sticks are probably the most destructive—think back to the quality of
work you produced for a parent who threatened to ground you unless you
finished your school project. But even carrots—promises of reward—can
be destructive. If an individual is keeping his or her eye on a monetary goal
or getting an A or getting ahead, instead of on the intrinsic interest of the
work itself, very often he or she will do work less good than what he or she
produces on those occasions when the work itself is the focus of attention.7
To what extent can the law help make the work itself the focus of creative
people’s attention, without denying them the recompense that the authors
both need in order to keep creating, and deserve? It is that dilemma, I think,
that many of us are trying to reconcile—we are seeking a sort of life and
law that de-emphasizes the commercial yet still provides some of the
benefits the commercial structure gives.
We are all exploring alternatives, and our paths are many. Some see
these new patterns in IP scholarship as reaching critical momentum when
Jessica Litman issued her invitation to see the public domain as more than a
default category8 and to see the legislative version of copyright as a product
Those are my particular
of less-than-reasoned decision making.9
landmarks. Others might attribute the takeoff point to Pam Samuelson,
particularly the conference on copyright and computers at Columbia that
she was key in organizing,10 or maybe Becky Eisenberg’s11 work on
sharing in science, or Larry Lessig’s unparalleled ability to bring copyright
issues to a popular audience,12 or Yochai Benkler’s work on networks,13 or
Lewis Hyde’s book on how gift relationships foster creativity.14
Whomever we nominate as our person who marked the shift—half the
people in this room come to mind as candidates; and one prime candidate
for the role of triggering the shift is not even a person, it is the Internet—we
come to a place where we look toward a similar set of goals but from a
thousand different angles.
We may resemble the group of blind men in the old joke, each of whom
touches part of an elephant and experiences something quite unlike what the
others report perceiving. But although individually we might not be able to
7. See generally AMABILE, supra note 5; KOHN, supra note 6.
8. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1012–22 (1990).
9. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001).
10. Symposium, Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2307 (1994).
11. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J 177 (1987).
12. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004), available at
http://www.free-culture.cc/freeculture.pdf.
13. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
14. LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY (3d ed.
1983).
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get a full mental picture of the elephant, together in pooling our
observations we might figure out what is what. That is what the community
of scholars hopes to do in all cases—join together in a common inquiry—
but does particularly well and particularly eagerly in our field.
So many of the current projects, including the commons project by the
tri-wizard15 team of Kathy, Brett, and Mike,16 explicitly say that they are
looking for contributions, trying to build models, and drawing people
together to compare what works and what does not work.17
In addition to this active seeking of cooperation, another noteworthy
development is the way in which new institutions to assist the public in
dealing with copyright are being formed. I guess it probably began with
Richard Stallman, the programmer famous for writing the GNU Emacs text
editor, which provides the winged feet of the GNU/LINUX system.18 He
founded the free software movement and created “copyleft”—a mode of
using copyright to enforce liberty of access—and instantiated it in the
General Public License (GPL).19 Since then, we have seen “Creative
Commons” begin and grow. We witnessed Larry Lessig’s noble if futile
effort to challenge copyright’s most recent durational extension.20 There is
a wonderful new set of standards for fair use for documentary filmmakers
that Peter Jaszi and Pat Aufderheide put together,21 which is inspiring
others as well.22 We see follow-on efforts by people all over the country.23
15. Hogwarts and its “Tri-Wizard Tournament” are probably trademarks, but my use is
lawful. (Yes, this is a wise-guy footnote.) For an interesting take on the real legal issues
involved in employing trademarked terms in nonsales contexts, see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark
A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 98 TRADEMARK REP.
1345, 1349 (2008) (arguing that trademark owners should not be able to use the Lanham Act
to restrain nontrademark use of their terms and symbols).
16. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg,
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment (Univ. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2008-26, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265793.
17. See id. at 1–2.
18. See,
e.g.,
Posting
of
Paul
McNamara
to
Network
World,
http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/25360 (Feb. 25, 2008, 07:56 EST)
(discussing Richard Stallman’s role as the creator of the GNU Emacs text editor).
19. The General Public License (GPL) uses copyright to enforce openness; thus, its
nickname is “copyleft.” Roughly speaking it works like this: programmers who make their
work available under the GPL retain their copyrights, but give anyone permission to copy,
sell, and adapt their programs—so long as the persons doing so also (1) make available their
(human-readable) source code instead of merely distributing impossible-to-decipher
(machine-readable) object code; and (2) employ copyleft in their resulting product by
including in them the GPL set of permissions and requirements. See generally GNU Project,
The General Public License, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html (last visited Mar. 23,
2009).
20. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003) (noting that Lawrence Lessig
argued on behalf of the petitioners).
21. E.g., ASS’N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA,
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), available
at http://centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/backgrounddocs/bestpractices.pdf; see also PATRICIA
AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 30–
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In other words, some in the community are trying now not only to help
lawyers, judges, and legislators think through how to do their work, but are
also trying to directly assist ordinary people in how they do their daily
business. And that is a very exciting new dimension for legal scholarship
generally.
Enough panegyric. I promised that in this speech I would also try to
provide our community with an extra analytic tool. As you will recall, my
offering is to suggest why it would be valuable to put more focus on the
harmless use of copyrighted works.
II. HARMFUL AND HARMLESS USES
There are differences between, on the one hand, interactions that cause
substantial harm to the plaintiff, and, on the other hand, harmless
interactions that trigger disputes only because the parties disagree about
how to allocate shares in the benefit they have mutually generated. These
differences deserve greater attention.
In his talk this morning, James Grimmelmann suggested that there may
be an opposition between the ethic of sharing and the ethic of trade.24 I am
not so sure. Both ethics involve reciprocity;25 after all, one never knows
when he or she will be the stranger in need rather than the owner who
shares. In copyright this is particularly true. As many observers have
noted, a kind of reciprocity is inherent in the authorial role: authors are
continually both creators of original work and users of material others have
created.26 Nevertheless, if James is correct that there is a conflict between
the ethic of trade and the ethic of sharing, that conflict is softest when the

32 (2004), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES
_Report.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, Freedom
to Teach:
An Educational Fair Use Project, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/research
/freedomtoteach# (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
23. And, of course, the professorial contribution is only a small part of a larger
movement that includes advocacy groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),
and many forms of community action.
24. James Grimmelmann, The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2005 (2009). See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora’s Amphora: The Ambiguity of
Gifts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 815 (1999) (arguing that the institution of contract is more
egalitarian than the institution of gift).
25. The authors who have written on reciprocity are legion. One wonderful place to
begin is with philosopher and polymath Lawrence Becker’s book Reciprocity. LAWRENCE C.
BECKER, RECIPROCITY (1986). For a recent exploration of reciprocity’s limits, see Ronald J.
Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming April 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1304283. On the behavioral literature regarding
reciprocity, see sources collected id. at 64 n.136.
26. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 8, at 966. This duality of position is also recognized by
economists such as William Landes and Richard Posner, who point out that increases in
copyright protection today benefit a current generation of creators but add to the costs of
creation that will be faced by the next generation. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 11, 69 (2003).
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thing we ask the owner to share is something he wasn’t using anyway,27 or
something that, if used by a stranger, would cause the owner no substantial
harm. The latter is my focus.
A. Gleaning
You may know the old saying that condemns the person who “reap[s]
where he has not sown.”28 Taken literally, the phrase is a condemnation of
27. It is often believed that a copyright or patent owner’s rights to exclude remain strong
even if the owner refuses to use or license the intangible. (I call this the question of whether
proprietors have a “right not to use” their writings and inventions.) But the most cited case
for the “right not to use” in copyright—Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932)—was
a tax case focusing on other issues, namely, whether a copyright is an “instrumentalit[y] of
the federal government” and hence immune from state taxation. Id. at 126–28. I see the U.S.
Supreme Court’s statement about the copyright owner’s freedom not to use in Doyal as
essentially dicta, or, at most, directed at the owner’s freedom not to use even in the face of a
federal government demand. The Doyal decision does not address whether an owner’s
decision not to use her property should affect the rights of private parties to glean.
The Supreme Court has made clear that, at least in some contexts, a refusal to use or
license will increase the defendant’s liberty under the fair use doctrine; this is true
particularly in markets (such as the “market” for criticism and parody) that the copyright
owner does not want to exploit. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Some
older cases also indicate that the public had some rights to share in unused intellectual
products. See, e.g., Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisc. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d
941, 945–46 (9th Cir. 1945) (dicta) (patentee’s refusal to license vitamin-enriching process
for oleomargarine, “the butter of the poor,” might justify denying injunction against patent
infringement).
Admittedly, sometimes an owner’s nonuse of her property lacks this effect. Thus,
commentators and courts often cite Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378–79
(1945), which stated that a patentee is free not to use, and to suppress, his or her patent. Yet
that statement in Coe was mere dicta; the Coe Court also noted that, “The record establishes
no intention by petitioner not to use his invention.” Id. at 380.
Nonuse by an owner sometimes even works to constrict a defendant’s liberty of use.
Thus, in Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), the Court
weighed the unused (unpublished) nature of the plaintiff’s work heavily against the
defendant’s fair use claim. Note, however, that in Harper & Row the plaintiff had plans to
publish the work almost immediately, so that the decision was about the copyright owner’s
control of “timing” his use, not about judicial reactions to nonuse. Further, when a slim
majority of Supreme Court Justices strongly deferred to the unpublished nature of a work in
Harper & Row, Congress rebuffed them by revising § 107 to state that the unpublished
nature of a work did not itself negate the public’s ability to make fair use of it. 17 U.S.C. §
107 (2006).
Some may wonder how the Supreme Court can square, on the one hand, the AcuffRose opinion’s seeming disdain for an owner’s desire not to award licenses to parodists,
with, on the other hand, standard judicial deference to owners’ “customary” commercial
decisions to refuse licenses based on ordinary marketing and timing criteria. For an example
of the latter, see not only Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539, but also more recent cases such as
Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, 150 F.3d 132 (1998)
(distinguishing usual and customary markets from “fair use markets”). I proffer what E. J.
Mishan called “welfare effects” as one criterion for distinguishing between, on the one hand,
cases where the courts are willing to defer to an owner’s decision not to use, and, on the
other hand, the cases where the courts are unwilling to give weight to markets the owner
leaves unused. See the discussion of pricelessness and welfare effects in Wendy J. Gordon,
Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Part
of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 182–87 (2003); E. J. Mishan, The Postwar
Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 18–19 (1971).
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ever keeping a windfall or a beneficial spillover or perhaps even an
inheritance. So interpreted, following the phrase’s advice would be insane;
in a civilized nation full of physical, technological, and cultural
infrastructure, we reap from birth what others have sown. Nevertheless, the
broad condemnation of “reaping without sowing” seems to find its way into
a substantial amount of judicial decisions and public debate. To help
people remember why the seeming command, “do not reap where you
haven’t sown,” should not and cannot be taken to broadly condemn free
riding, let me take two examples from the past. One is the Biblical practice
of gleaning. Gleaning served the community in both of the ways that
concerned James Grimmelmann in his discussion this morning.29 Gleaning
honored the trading ethic by allowing a farmer his primary harvest, and
honored the sharing ethic by endowing the poor with an entitlement to food.
Although the agricultural metaphor30 of reap/sow is sometimes thought
to have a biblical origin, the Five Books of Moses do not condemn the
substantially harmless reaping of another’s harvest. To the contrary: if a
Jew owned a field, at harvest time he or she was commanded to leave some
grain standing in the corners for the people who were poor, and the latter
were supposed to come and glean. Biblically, then, part of the property
owner’s obligation was to sow without reaping every product of the field;
conversely, to reap without sowing is a right of both the stranger and the
community.31
Seventeen years ago, I argued for limits on IP rights32 based in part on a
gleaning argument. I wrote, “The remote beneficiary who makes an
unexpected and creative use of the work arguably does not reap the
plaintiff’s harvest. At most, she gleans in a neglected corner of the field,
and by gleaning Ruth met Boaz.”33

28. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1967); Int’l News Serv.
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); see also Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1067 (2005) (quoting KAPLAN, supra, at
2).
29. Grimmelmann, supra note 24.
30. I am not sure who first called it “the agricultural metaphor”; it was probably Ben
Kaplan.
31. Joseph Singer translates the applicable Torah passage this way:
When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap all the way to the edges
of your field, or gather the gleanings of your harvest. You shall not pick your
vineyard bare, or gather the fallen fruit of your vineyard; you shall leave them for
the poor and the stranger: I am the Lord your God.
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF
OWNERSHIP, at frontispiece (2000) (translating Leviticus 19:9); see also id. at 38–62
(discussing the practice of gleaning and other property-sharing institutions in Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam).
32. Most people see “IP rights” and think “intellectual property rights.” However, I
think “intellectual property” is a term that perniciously misdescribes our field. I therefore
use “IP” to stand for “intangible products.”
33. Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 191–92 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon,
Restitutionary Impulse].
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I thought that “Ruth met Boaz” was the capper to the argument. But it
turned out no one knew who they were. So let me tell you. Ruth was a
poor woman who gleaned in a field owned by Boaz. The two married and
became the grandparents of King David. From King David’s line
supposedly sprang Joseph, husband of Mary; it is sometimes argued that
Mary was also a descendant.34 As two important traditions, Jewish and
Christian, both ascribe great importance to the lineage of Ruth and Boaz,
the meeting of those two people during gleaning provides a wonderful
image to underscore the fecundity that can flow from allowing some
reaping without sowing.
So the Bible rejects a rule that would forbid all “reaping without
sowing.” Industries engaged in anticopying public campaigns might preach
to potential copyists the commandment that “Thou Shalt Not Steal,” but the
Bible makes clear that reaping without sowing need not constitute theft.
B. A Different Perspective on INS v. AP
Let me now essay a differently angled attack. I want to look at the most
famous American application of the agricultural metaphor: the Supreme
Court’s majority opinion in International News Service v. Associated Press
(INS).35 In that 1918 case, the Supreme Court of the United States enjoined
one news service (that had been barred from the European theater of war)
from copying the other news service’s published news.36 I will try to show
how that case is all about harm.
In most of the cases where the “reap without sowing” command has been
recognized, like INS, the situation isn’t simply one where the defendant has
benefited without paying. Rather, the benefit is taken at the expense of the
plaintiff.37 For the reaping to be condemned, it usually must be harmful,
34. See,
e.g.,
John
Gill’s
Exposition
of
the
Entire
Bible,
http://www.freegrace.net/gill/Luke/Luke_3.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (commenting on
Luke 3:23: “Which was the son of Eli; meaning, not that Joseph was the son of Eli; for he
was the son of Jacob, according to [Matthew] 1:16, but Jesus was the son of Eli; and which
must be understood, and carried through the whole genealogy . . . though it is true indeed
that Joseph was the son of Eli, having married his daughter; Mary was the daughter of
Eli . . . .”). Wikipedia explains John Gill’s position this way: “Gill (theologian), for
example, claimed that Matthew’s gospel gives Jesus’ legal lineage through Joseph while
Luke gives Jesus’ biological lineage through Mary.” Wikipedia.org, Genealogy of Jesus,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancestors_of_Christ (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
35. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
36. Id. at 245.
37. This may have been true even in Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co.,
456 N.E.2d 84, 92–93 (Ill. 1983). In that case, the Supreme Court of Illinois used the state
law of misappropriation to enjoin the offerors of a futures contract from pegging their “index
price” (of stock market performance) to the Dow Jones average. The court’s decision was
shocking, in part because it ignored federal preemption, but also because the use planned by
the defendant was apparently both productive and harmless. Yet the judicial urge to avoid
harm probably paid a role: I suspect that the result was dictated by the court’s fear that if the
defendant prevailed, the aura of “gambling” sometimes attributed to commodities trading
would stick to Dow Jones, publisher of the Wall Street Journal, and harm the reputation of
that conservative entity.
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usually not only to the plaintiff, but to the society as a whole. This was
clearly recognized in the Motorola case, where the Second Circuit said that
it would save a hot-news misappropriation claim from preemption only
when the defendant’s actions were so harmful that they threatened to leave
the public without the service.38
To illustrate how important the harm element is to these cases that
purport to be about reaping and sowing, then, I would like to talk about an
aspect of the INS case that I have taught to my classes for years, but have
seen no hint of in print until fairly recently, in Douglas Baird’s wonderful
recounting of the litigation’s background.39 First, though, the more familiar
story.
Many of us have noticed that, in INS, the majority opinion says that the
law should stop INS from copying AP’s news because INS was doing its
copying “precisely at the point where profit [was] to be reaped.”40 If the
copyist was allowed to continue and expand its practice of copying without
remuneration, the company that had the only front-line access to war news
could have collapsed, leaving the copyist without anyone to copy and
unable to engage in war reportage itself because of European rules that
uniquely constrained it; and the public would have been left without firsthand reportage of World War I.41 Thus, the INS story mimics a prisoner’s
dilemma in many ways; if both parties fail to cooperate with each other,
they both suffer.42
But this argument was far from watertight, of course. As with all
prisoner’s dilemmas, disaster is not inevitable. Among other possibilities,
had the Court denied AP the relief it sought against INS, the two news-

38. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). The court
listed three elements:
We therefore find the extra elements—those in addition to the elements of
copyright infringement—that allow a “hot-news” claim to survive preemption are:
(i) the time-sensitive value of factual information, (ii) the free-riding by a
defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence of the product or service
provided by the plaintiff.
Id. at 853 (dicta).
National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.’s dicta might conceivably be
interpreted as allowing a hot-news claim where only the first two elements are present. The
interpretation of International News Service v. Associated Press (INS), 248 U.S. 215, urged
infra, an interpretation that focuses on the two news services’ relations with their customers
rather than with each other, will, I think, make clearer why that third element is crucial to the
“hot-news” precedent. Of course, the preemption issue raises additional complications; it is
possible that the court was incorrect, and that the federal law might preempt even a state
claim that contained all three elements.
39. Douglas G. Baird, The Story of INS v. AP, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES:
PROPERTY, NATURAL MONOPOLY, AND THE UNEASY LEGACY OF A CONCOCTED CONTROVERSY
9, 9–35 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
40. INS, 248 U.S. at 240.
41. See, e.g., Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 33, at 266–73 (discussing
misuses of the INS case).
42. Id. at 267–68.
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gathering entities could have entered into a “gentlemen’s agreement”43
about what was acceptable practice, using their prospect of iterated
transactions as a way to keep each other disciplined.
Yet a defendant’s victory in INS would have threatened a harm beyond
what was identified in this now-standard story, however—a harm that
would have been much more obvious, immediate, and, I think,
irremediable. This would have been the harm to each organization’s
internal structure.44 I suggest that we expand our attention from the biparty
relationship between AP and INS, to the multilevel relationship each entity
had to its respective members and customers, the local newspapers.45
If you publish the New Haven Register or the Hartford Courant, you
probably can’t afford your own international or even nonlocal reporters. So
you pay money to a news service like the AP. The news service gathers the
money from you and other similarly situated newspapers, hires international
and national correspondents,46 and makes the resulting news stories
available to you.
But how likely are you, local newspaper publisher, to pay fees to a news
service if you know you can copy their news for free? That is an important
question, because if INS had gone the other way, that is, had the Court
denied AP the relief against copying that it sought, most lawyers of the day
would probably assume that newspapers could copy news freely.
(Admittedly, copyright law could still make the small newspapers rewrite
the news stories so as to avoid taking expression, but, if the dissent had
prevailed in INS, any newspaper would be free to copy all the facts it
wished to.)47 In such a context, the hometown newspaper would just drop

43. However, Douglas Baird shows that the two news organizations were not situated on
an equal playing field. See Baird, supra note 39, at 24–25. AP was much more powerful;
among other things it had exclusive cartel arrangements with foreign governments to obtain
news. Id. at 25. Nevertheless, some kind of agreement might have been forthcoming (pace
antitrust, of course), particularly since, as Baird points out, “the most important member of
AP,” id. at 26, and the owner of INS, id. at 29, was the same person: William Randolph
Hearst.
44. Baird suggests that there was no real dispute between INS and AP to be resolved—
whether by agreement or litigation. Id. at 35. The effective head of AP, Kent Cooper,
“understood that the victory had little to do with INS and everything to do with his vision of
AP’s future.” Id. at 30. By this, I think Baird is referring to the possibility I mention in text
immediately below, namely, that without a rule against copying news, AP newspapers might
have defected, and future customers (such as radio stations, id. at 31) might not have signed
on.
45. Baird does a wonderful job of providing such background. See generally id. My
version is much simplified.
46. Although AP’s initial strength lay in its technical infrastructure—“leasing the
telegraph lines and hiring telegraph operators,” id. at 13—and not in gathering news, by the
time of the litigation, it had begun serious news-gathering efforts. Id. at 19.
47. In the litigated case, INS apparently asserted no copyright in the news. Int’l News
Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 232–33 (1918). In 1918, rigid legal formalities
made it awkward and difficult to obtain copyright for works such as newspapers. Baird,
supra note 39, at 12. Even if INS had claimed copyright in its news stories, copyright does
not extend to facts. INS, 248 U.S. at 234.
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its news-service membership or subscription. That would be particularly
true of the West Coast papers, which, because of the earth’s rotation, would
even get pre-daybreak access to the news printed in East Coast morning
papers.
The Court might reasonably have thought that if it refused to enjoin the
defendant’s copying, no entity could collect enough fees from the small
newspapers to afford to send out national and overseas correspondents.
This could drastically impair the knowledge base upon which democracy
rests. If the Court had such a prospect in mind, it might well have thought
it proper to stop that kind of copying.48
So, in INS, for all of its dicta about refraining from “reap[ing] where
[you] ha[ve] not sown,”49 the more applicable rule seems to be, you can’t
“reap” if using the product of others’ intelligence and effort is going to be
so harmful to them as to make it impossible to get an important product to
the public.50 Thus, if you look at the granddaddy of the “reap without
sowing” cases, it is not about prohibiting somebody like Ruth from taking
some grain she did not plant; it is about prohibiting a whole crowd from
taking the entire field of grain.
C. Exploring a Provisional Rule
So far we seem to have a provisional rule—still untested, since this is just
a thought experiment51—but the rule looks like this: the law should not
permit suit for “reaping without sowing” except where the reaping causes
substantial harm to the plaintiff and the public. In my thought experiment, I
would extend this rule to both common-law causes of action such as right of
publicity and misappropriation (to the extent, if any, these state rights
survive preemption) and to copyright itself.
This would mean drastically fewer lawsuits. That may not be a bad
thing. After all, back in the early morning of law and economics, Judge
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed suggested that, all things being
The public domain status of facts under copyright law is even clearer today than it
was in the very early twentieth century; prior to Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340 (1991), and the
enactment of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), courts occasionally stretched to “protect” laboriously
gathered facts under copyright in one way or another. (Truth be told, even today, some
copyright courts come close to protecting bare facts.)
48. Justice Louis Brandeis’s dissenting opinion made clear that, whether or not the
prohibition of copying facts was wise, such a ruling should have been left to the legislature,
which, in detailed provisions or administrative regulations, could have protected the free
speech and antitrust issues so raised. INS, 248 U.S. at 264–67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). A
simple injunction in favor of AP could have left many newspaper readers without news of
the war. As it happens, however, Baird argues, the injunction made little difference to the
behavior of INS. Baird, supra note 39, at 30.
49. INS, 248 U.S. at 239.
50. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997).
51. I am far from having resolved all relevant issues, especially regarding remedial
questions. For example, in this essay, I suggest that profitable commercial adapters of
copyrighted work must pay; should non-profitable adapters be free of any obligations? For
one earlier take on the topic, see Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 33, at 258–66.
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equal, the cheapest thing to do with injuries is to let them lie where they
fall.52 Of course, they knew that not all things are equal—often letting
injuries lie where they fall means long-term social loss because injurers will
have no incentive to avoid careless behavior. Nevertheless, that starting
observation of theirs may have identified one reason plaintiffs have the
burden of proof; in cases of deadlock, the damage remains with the
defendant, where it already lies.
The economic insight known as “moral hazard”53 has even more
importance than does avoidance of administrative costs. Since in any
interaction both parties play a role (as Saul Levmore says, it “takes two to
tort”54), by leaving losses on defendants, people in defendants’ position will
have incentives to take more care in the future.
A similar set of observations might be made, in converse,55 about copyright.
52. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1112 n.43 (1972).
53. “Moral hazard” points out that people who are fully assured of reimbursement in
case of loss will be more careless than if they expected to bear part or all of the potential
losses themselves.
54. Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L.
REV. 771, 822 (1982) (citing R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960)).
55. Let me make clear some of the ways in which negligence law mirrors copyright
and vice versa. Any mirror produces data points that are identical but reversed; it is
therefore sometimes difficult to keep the relationships between mirrored structures in
mind. Here are the major mirrored structures:
•
Negligence law is primarily concerned with internalizing harms, while
copyright is primarily concerned with internalizing benefits.
•
Negligence law seeks to decrease socially destructive behavior, while
copyright seeks to increase socially productive behavior.
•
Most of negligence law aims its primary incentives toward defendants
and those upon whose behavior the defendants have some influence
(such as careless employees). Conversely, copyright aims most of its
incentives toward plaintiffs and those over whose behavior the plaintiffs
have some influence (such as creative employees, or authors to whom
publishers as copyright assignees pay royalties).
o Thus, the rules of negligence law are crafted for the primary
purpose of decreasing the careless or otherwise undesirable
behavior of defendants (or their employees).
o Conversely, copyright law is crafted for the primary purpose of
increasing the socially desirable production of creative works
by plaintiffs (or their creative employees and assignors)
•
Both copyright and negligence law have some concern with the
incentives of the other party as well.
o For tort law, this concern primarily embodies itself in defenses.
For copyright law, this concern primarily embodies itself in
limitations to the plaintiff’s rights.

Thus, the tort doctrines of assumption of risk and
contributory or comparative negligence seek to
minimize the so-called “moral hazard” that plaintiffs
will take inadequate precautions to avoid injury;
these tort doctrines, therefore, leave harm on some
plaintiffs to encourage other people in plaintiff’s
position to take appropriate precautions.
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The cheapest thing to do, administratively, is to allow beneficial spillovers
to lie where they happen to fall. And when people in the recipient
(defendant) position are doing no harm, and are capable of creating new
works and benefits of their own, maybe leaving gains on recipients will
encourage people in defendants’ position to build productively on what they
have received.
Just as moral hazard tells us that defendants who are fully immunized
from harm might be careless, the converse is also true: defendants who are
fully excluded from spillover benefits may be unproductive. And given that
intangibles are often best exploited by decentralized, spontaneous
outpourings of effort,56 particularly in the copyright arena,57 assuring some
return and thus incentives to downstream users is particularly important.58



As for copyright, the converse encouragement for
defendants can be found in many doctrines that limit
the plaintiff’s rights, such as the “idea/expression
dichotomy,” the limitation of the right to control
performance to only “public” performance, overall
durational limits, plus a host of specific exceptions
such as the first sale doctrine. All these consistently
leave some benefits with defendants to encourage
them to build on predecessor works.
o The policy concern with the incentives of the “other party”
sometimes switches locus without substantially changing its
effect. Foreseeability is a good if controversial example.

The tort of negligence puts a burden on the plaintiff
to prove that the harm done was foreseeable to a
reasonable person in the defendant’s position.

Copyright in the “fair use doctrine” encourages
defendants to show that their use causes no
significant harm to markets that the plaintiff
expected to exploit. That is, the defendant might try
to show that if his use has any negative impact, it
affects only markets unforeseeable to plaintiffs.
On the latter point, see Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969 (2007), who argues that foreseeability has played a strong historic
role in fair use that needs to be reasserted more strongly today; also see Wendy J. Gordon,
Foreseeability and the Harm/Benefit Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. [hereinafter Gordon,
Harm/Benefit Distinction] (forthcoming 2009) (arguing that foreseeability does play a role in
fair use, and explaining why negligence law is a more apt model for copyright infringement
than is trespass-to-land); also see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright
Incentives,
122
HARV.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2009),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117655 (arguing that copyright law be revised to require proof of
foreseeability as an element of plaintiff’s case).
On the general question of tort/copyright parallels, see generally Wendy J. Gordon,
Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image: “Harms,” “Benefits,” and the Uses and Limits of
Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2003).
56. There is a substantial literature arguing the opposite, of course. See, e.g., Edmund W.
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (the most
famous and probably first enunciation of the “prospect theory” favoring centralization of
control). But the argument for centralization is probably stronger for patent than for
copyright. See Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for
Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 170 n.38 (2002) (“[T]he centralization argument [of the
prospect theory] has little force when applied to copyright, a field whose merit is diversity
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Thus, the “permissible gleaning” rule has many purposes. Among other
things, the rule aims to avoid interfering with the defendant’s own creative
processes, to preserve the defendant’s incentives to build on what came
before, to help the owner execute a moral duty to allow gleaning, and to do
all this without losing basic authorial rewards. Since the “gleaning” rule
does not forbid suit where harm is done, it preserves the basic incentives
and expectations of those who are potential plaintiffs.
Yet I remain concerned that this gleaning rule may not provide enough
for the creative class; it might underincentivize plaintiffs in a random way.
To correct this, I suggest limiting the permissible-gleaning rule. Among
other things,59 I would allow a plaintiff to sue for license fees for a
substantially harmless use when the defendant is making a use-yielding
profit60 sufficient to leave both parties with benefits, so long as asking
advance permission for use would not interfere with the defendant’s
creative process. Under this approach, if a large-scale enterprise, like a
movie, made extensive use of a copyrighted work without permission, it
would be suable for a share of its profits, even if the work on which the
movie was based lost no sales as a result of its adaptation into movie form.
This limitation on the “go and glean” rule is explored further infra Part II.F.
rather than centralization.”). For helpful discussion, see Henry E. Smith, Intellectual
Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007).
57. Paul Goldstein in his treatise argues the primary purpose of copyright is to induce
great variety in works. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 1 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 1.14 (3rd ed.
2006).
58. As a corollary, I would argue that 17 U.S.C. § 103 should be revised to allow
copyright in any creative derivative work, regardless of whether the author of the derivative
work employed the prior work lawfully. (This change would make copyright follow the
current pattern in patent law.) Under copyright’s current § 103(a), any creativity that is
“intermixed” with unlawful use loses its copyright, so that, for example, the author of an
unauthorized translation would not only be subject to an infringement suit, but the copyright
owner of the translated book could publish the new translation and owe nothing to the
translator. This impairs the translator’s incentives. Note that even if § 103 were revised as I
suggest, the first author still has leverage to obtain his own payments: the author of the
creative derivative work could not do much with the work—could not publish it, publicly
perform it, etc.—unless he had fair use, or had the consent of the person owning copyright in
the work upon which the derivative was built. My change would give the derivative’s author
more bargaining leverage than he has under current law.
Admittedly, the authors of unlawfully made derivative works have some bargaining
power now, not only because the preparation of the work might be sheltered by the fair use
doctrine (cf. patent’s experimental use exception), but also because the statute deprives the
derivative author of copyright only in that “part of the work in which such material has been
used unlawfully.” 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (emphasis added). Yet some judges have gone
so far as to hint (contrary to legislative history and statutory language) that any unlawful use
taints the whole derivative work so that even separable portions of the latter cannot bear their
own copyright. Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 408 (7th Cir. 2000). It would be better to
amend § 103(a) to follow the patent model and allow even the unauthorized maker of a
derivative work her copyright. Then, if the derivative work is valuable, both the author of
the derivative work and the author of the work on which it is based can profit.
59. In addition, as will appear below, I would allow suit over a substantially harmless
use for the purpose of trying title.
60. As per my caveat supra note 51, I retain doubts about how to handle the
unprofitable commercial defendant.
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D. Defining Harm, Benefit, and Other Terms of the Provisional Rule
Before getting into those details, however, let me address some
definitional issues. Because in a speech one lacks time to fully explore
what construals of “harm” and “benefit” might prove most productive for
discussion, let me stipulate some simple starting points.
Negative divergence from a baseline is “harm,” and positive divergence
from a baseline is “benefit.” As a baseline, I would use the welfare of the
party in a world where the other person’s action had not occurred. This is a
variant of the standard but-for test. For example: I am “benefited” when I
enjoy reading a book another person has written because “but for” the
action of the author, I would not have the book to read. (How much I am
benefited may vary with what my other recreational or reading options
might have been.) I cause “harm” if I make a thousand copies of the book
and give or sell them to people who otherwise would have purchased copies
from the author’s designated publisher; the author is “harmed” because “but
for” my actions, the author would have had income from these other
customers.
I also need to specify what metric of welfare to use. Following John
Stuart Mill, I would not count setbacks to moralizing interests61 as a kind of
“harm.” But I would count severe insults to dignity as harm,62 and would
61. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1978)
(1859) [hereinafter MILL, ON LIBERTY]; see also JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 14–27
(1984) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS] distinguishing “harm to others” and
“offense to others” from paternalistic and other interests). Regarding moralizing motives
such as a disapproval of drinking, sexuality, or eating pork, “Neither the intensity of the
distress nor the number of people who share it seem to affect [Mill’s] conclusion that it is
illegitimate for the majority to impose its values on the rest of society.” C. L. TEN, Mill’s
Defence of Liberty, in J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY IN FOCUS 212, 214 (John Gray & G. W. Smith
eds., 1991). John Stuart Mill “reject[s] . . . these forms of distress as a proper basis for social
interference with the liberty of individuals.” Id. at 214. For analysis of the possible
distinction between harm and offense, and a probing definitional discussion of “harm,” see
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra; JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985).
Feinberg’s discussion of “benefits” is much less satisfying than his discussion of
harm. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 311–17 (1990). Among other things, he begins with transfer payments as a type of
“benefit.” Id. at 312. By contrast, the primary economic issue for private law is not the
disposition of fixed monetary amounts, but rather how to encourage A and B to deploy their
resources in a way that increases the social total. Feinberg indirectly touches on the latter
issue in his discussion of collective goods, see id. at 316–17, but the matter lies far from his
focus.
62. I would have to see an extreme dignitary harm before recommending a legal
response. The United States would be wrong, I believe, to adopt the European “moral
rights” approach that puts the authors’ dignitary interests on a pedestal that can impinge on
free speech rights. We have already gone too far in adopting 17 U.S.C. § 106A. But see
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 (2006) (arguing for an interestingly
circumscribed set of moral rights).
It is hard for me to imagine what might be a severe enough dignitary harm to warrant
legal restraint in the copyright arena, where First Amendment free speech doctrine privileges
most expressions of opinion or emotion that give rise to dignitary and emotional harm. See,
e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). But I have learned that my
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count economic injury as “harm.” I would even count Schumpeterian
creative destruction as “harm”63—remembering always that harms can be
outweighed by benefits. (My thought experiment today explores the
possibility that harmless uses should be free of liability; it at no point
suggests that all harmful uses should be liable.64) Most importantly, I want
to emphasize the importance of the Millian guideline that we should be
wary of enacting laws that inhibit harmless behavior.65
E. Does the Common Law or Lockean Philosophy Pose a Challenge to a
Rule that Allows Gleaning of Copyrighted Work?
In addition to setting out these definitional starting points, I want to admit
a difficulty with the provenance of the gleaning rule: in ordinary tangible
property, the common law prohibits even harmless trespasses. The
difficulty is not fatal to my project. After all, as I have argued elsewhere,
imagination is limited in this regard. Notably, I would have thought that only entries in and
around the home could cause severe enough dignitary damage to warrant more than nominal
monetary relief for a physically harmless trespass—until reality taught me differently. Thus,
in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 166 (Wis. 1997), punitive damages
were upheld (appropriately in my view) for a physically harmless trespass not to a home, but
to a field. The defendant crossed the plaintiff’s land in a manner that belittled both the
elderly landowner and the rule of law.
63. Creative destruction is ex hypothesi socially beneficial, as far as we can judge from
the economist who coined the phrase. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 81–86 (5th ed. 2008). Joseph Schumpeter argues that ordinary competition
between similar competitors with slightly differentiated products is not the source of much
consumer benefit. Rather, monopoly and oligopoly are undercut by the emergence of “the
new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of
organization” that “strikes [at] . . . the existing firms[’] . . . foundations and their very lives.”
Id. at 84. This process, which Schumpeter calls “creative destruction,” “expands output and
brings down prices.” Id. at 85.
For an extension of the Schumpeterian position to copyright, see generally, for
example, Ariel Katz, Substitution and Schumpeterian Effects over the Lifecycle of
Copyrighted Works (Aug. 5, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1205679. For an
extension of creative destruction to issues of cultural cross-fertilization, see TYLER COWEN,
CREATIVE DESTRUCTION (2002).
64. Mill took a similar position: he did not argue that all harmful acts should be
controlled, only that the social control should be restricted to prohibiting acts that are
harmful to persons other than the actor.
65. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 61, at 73–91. Mill argued that that “the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” Id. at 9. Joel Feinberg points out that Mill also
seemed to contemplate preventing offense to others as an additional rightful basis for
coercion. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 61, at 14 (citing MILL, supra note 61, at
9). The Millian concern has special resonance in the free speech arena, which is copyright’s
home turf. See generally Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm and the First Amendment
(Univ. of Iowa, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-15, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1367624.
In past work, I overstated the irrelevance of Mill to copyright. See Gordon, An
Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1385–86 & n.194 (1989). Note, however,
that I still stop short of fully embracing Mill’s harm principle. Inter alia, I believe that some
harmless uses should give rise to liability (as in the case of the profitable movie
hypothesized in text).
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conditional schemes of liability (such as negligence and restitution) are
better models for the regulation of intangibles than is the real-property tort
of trespass to land.66 Yet even if one does follow common-law rules of
trespass, we find analogies that favor changing copyright law to allow most
harmless use.
But first, let us look at the challenge the trespass tort seems to pose to my
provisional gleaning rule. Under my provisional rule, copyright owners in
most contexts would be under a duty to allow gleaning.67 In the commonlaw system, however, only in cases of emergency is a landowner obligated
to share her property with others. For John Locke, a philosopher often cited
as providing a normative basis for private property, the obligation to share
one’s property was similarly quite narrow: in the state of nature, strangers
were entitled to share in our property only when they were in dire need and
we had more than enough,68 or where our property would rot without their
using it.69 This is somewhat surprising for Locke,70 especially given his

66. See, e.g., Gordon, Harm/Benefit Distinction, supra note 55 (negligence as a model);
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1544–49 (1993) [hereinafter
Gordon, Self-Expression] (property rights conditional on satisfying the Lockean proviso);
Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 33, passim (restitution as a guide for rewriting
the common law governing misappropriation of intangibles).
67. Note that I assume not only a lack of legal right to exclude in the landowner, but
also a claim of right to enter in the public. This follows the Biblical injunction, which not
only would deprive a landowner of legal rights to stop gleaning, but would also prohibit him
from erecting fences or using other modes of self-help to exclude gleaners. See supra note 31
and accompanying text.
68. In the First Treatise on Government, John Locke writes,
But we know God hath not left one man so to the mercy of another, that he may
starve him if he please . . . he has given his needy brother a right to the surplusage
of his goods . . . . so charity gives every man a title to so much out of another’s
plenty as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist
otherwise . . . .
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 29–
30 (bk. I, § 42) (2003); see also id. at 102 (bk. II, § 6).
69. Thus Locke writes that one can “acquire a propriety” in wild fruits or beasts,
but if they perished, in his possession, without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or
the venison putrefied, before he could spend it; he offended against the common
law of nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour’s share, for
he had no right, farther than his use . . . .
Id. at 116 (bk. II, § 37); see also id. (bk. II, § 38) (“The same measures governed the
possession of land too . . . . [I]f . . . the fruit of his planting perished without gathering[,] . . .
this part of the earth . . . might be the possession of any other.”).
70. It is somewhat surprising that Locke did not see natural law as requiring landowners
to share when sharing is largely harmless. Perhaps it was his focus on tangible property, or
the influence of the common law of his time, that led him in this direction. It would have
been more in keeping with his overall theory to have permitted a larger degree of sharing
than he did: For Locke, the general duty of persons to refrain from taking the fruit of others’
labor, which is the sign of property, derived from the moral imperative to avoid causing
harm. See Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 66, at 1544–49 (describing “[t]he [h]armbased [s]tructure of Locke’s [a]rgument for [p]roperty”). For the Locke of the Two
Treatises, therefore, one would imagine that a property invasion would become wrongful
only when it causes substantial harm. Thus, it is surprising that Locke gives strangers a
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religious orientation. Nevertheless, Locke does not impose on property
owners a general obligation to allow strangers to glean.
As for the common law, its miserly approach to sharing might be
explainable by the tangible nature of its ordinary subject matter. I do not
speak merely of the fact that some tangible property can only be shared by
being destroyed. (When I share my apple with you, I lose the part you bite
off.) Tangible property has a special set of emotional connections as well.
To invade a physical home is to invade privacy and security. By contrast,
as has often been noted, copying a document miles from its author need
cause the author no distress at all. Therefore the landowner might be
entitled to exclude physically harmless trespasses for reasons much less
applicable to intangibles.
As for Locke’s reluctance to embrace a broad doctrine of sharing,
perhaps an explanation lies in the fact that, for Locke, property came into
being only if it satisfied a stringent moral test, namely, Locke’s proviso that
the appropriation had to leave “enough, and as good” for others.71 Maybe
the owners of such specially justified property claims are rightfully subject
to fewer obligations than are real-life owners, whether of Biblical fields or
today’s copyrights.
That is not a question whose merits I reach today, but let’s play with it.
What if it were true, that fulfilling the proviso by leaving “enough, and as
good” for others, entitles a property owner to exclude everyone, except for
the narrow exceptions of dire need and rotting food?
Then it would be worthwhile to determine which of today’s owners
satisfy the Lockean proviso. Exploring that intriguing question will
indirectly lead us to one of my major qualifications on the “go and glean”
rule.
F. Modifying the “Go and Glean” Rule
One way to understand Locke’s proviso that the appropriator leave
“enough, and as good,” is that it imposes a precondition to property. Before
a property claim can be the rightful sort that other persons have duties to
respect, “enough and as good” must be left. And one way to read “enough
and as good” is as requiring that the property claimant do no harm by this

liberty to use our property only in case of great need, or on the occasion of our allowing our
property to rot.
71. LOCKE, supra note 68, at 112 (bk. II, § 27) (“For this labour being the
unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once
joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.”).
There is immense debate about the proviso, including whether Locke meant it as a
true precondition to the just acquisition of property, or whether the proviso simply indicated
an area particularly free of doubt for Locke; what “enough, and as good” should be measured
against; and so on. For my own views, see generally Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra
note 33. For a particularly intriguing survey of alternatives that emphasizes the many
possibilities in the word “harm,” see generally John Arthur, Resource Acquisition and Harm,
17 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 337 (1987).
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appropriation.72 Therefore, I argue that before a property claim can be
recognized as valid against a particular person, the property owner must
show that his claim causes no harm to that other person.73 As part of the
thought experiment, then, let us assume that today’s copyright owners can
limit their duties to share only in cases of dire exigency and can refuse to
allow gleaning—if and only if their property claim itself does no harm to
the user they are suing.
When might that occur? How could a defendant’s paying money to a
copyright claimant do no harm to the defendant? One answer is, when the
defendant has made a commercial use that can give the property claimant an
appropriate share, and still leave the defendant as well off as he would have
been “but for” the lawsuit and “but for” the plaintiff’s creativity. For the
defendant to be as well off after losing a lawsuit as he would have been “but
for” his exposure to plaintiff’s work of authorship, the law would need to
ensure that the defendant would retain an appropriate profit after paying the
plaintiff, and that the need for the defendant to anticipate the need to make
such payment would not interfere with the creative enterprise. In such a
case, the proviso is met.74
72. See Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 66, at 1563–64 (explaining the role of “no
harm done” in Locke’s response to Sir Robert Filmer); see also LOCKE, supra note 68, at 114
(bk. II, § 33) (“Nor was this appropriation . . . any prejudice to any other man, since there
was still enough, and as good left . . . . [F]or he that leaves as much as another can make use
of, does as good as take nothing at all.”).
73. Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 66, at 1570 (“Individualized and Nonfungible
Nature of the Proviso’s Protection”).
74. In other words: in such a case, awarding relief to the plaintiff will do no harm to the
defendant. See Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 33, at 205–11, 224–25 (avoiding
harm to the defendant); see also Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 66, at 1560–72
(avoiding harm to defendants’ entitlement to cultural heritage).
In some instances, a showing of a profitable bureaucratic or commercial use might
also satisfy the “harm to plaintiff” requirement: when a standard profit-making opportunity
exists, then “but for” the particular defendant, the plaintiff would have had another, similar
user to whom to license. This possibility raises issues regarding the appropriate baseline, but
is intriguing, and is indirectly suggested by Bohannan, supra note 55, especially at 989
(exploring a two-part test for “harm” in copyright that bears several analogies to this essay’s
approach).
Note that my example of the defendant who can pay a monetary judgment yet
remain whole contemplates a defendant who has not been affirmatively harmed by exposure
to the copyrighted work. When however the work has harmed the defendant, the defendant
might have a full defense under the self-defense privilege that is honored by some fair use
cases. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1150, 1153
(9th Cir. 1986) (minister who was ridiculed in a copyrighted mock advertisement distributed
thousands of copies of the advertisement to his supporters in an effort to raise money). The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that “the public interest in allowing an
individual to defend himself against such derogatory personal attacks serves to rebut the
presumption of unfairness.” Id. at 1153. This self-defense privilege has its parallel in the
Lockean proviso that property only arises where “enough, and as good” is left for others.
An example of how a work can cause harm can be seen in the litigation involving
Alice Randall, author of The Wind Done Gone. That novel, an Afro-centric critical sequel to
Gone with the Wind that was, for a while, banned from store shelves for copyright
infringement. Randall stated that she would rather have been “born blind” than have read
Gone with the Wind. Such an author’s position in life has been negatively affected by the
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These conditions are likely to be met when an entity uses copyrighted
work without consent as part of deliberate large-scale commercial
enterprise. Therefore, I suggest that such an enterprise—even if harmless—
should be subject to a “duty not to glean without permission” so long as
relief is structured to leave the defendant as well off as he would have been
had he never used the plaintiff’s work.
This is not so different from the common law after all. Harmless
trespasses give rise to significant monetary recovery only in cases of
significant commercial use.75
To recap: if the defendant is making a deliberate use, particularly one
that involves much forethought and organization,76 there may be a good
case for allowing the copyright owner to sue even for harmless use of her
work. After such a lawsuit, if damages are allocated appropriately, both
parties should be left benefited—better off than they would have been had
the other’s actions not occurred.77
Some propertarians might argue that the courts should allow plaintiffs to
collect license fees and have an injunction in any case where the defendant
predecessor work. To forbid Randall the tools necessary to deal fully with the change can
make her worse off than if she had never encountered the work at all. Wendy J. Gordon,
Render Copyright unto Caesar: Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 82
(2004) [hereinafter Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar]; see SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga.), rev’d, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.),
and 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001) (enjoining production, display, distribution, advertising,
sale, or offer for sale of the book The Wind Done Gone).
Note that I am not arguing that a harmed audience member has a legal right to
redress; such an asserted private right would probably fall to First Amendment scrutiny. See,
e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 458 U.S. 46, 53, 55–56 (1998) (First Amendment bars
recognizing a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress by a minister who was
ridiculed in Hustler magazine). I am instead arguing for a self-help privilege, a liberty to use
in self-defense or self-explanation. This distinction is well established, at least in private
law. In the libel literature, for example, one reason for denying public figures strong legal
rights in defamation is their ability to use publicity to explain themselves. The First
Amendment does not limit the latter.
75. Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1032 (Ky. 1936) (defendant created a
tourist attraction conducting tours to a cave that lay partly under plaintiff’s land; the suit
resulted in giving plaintiff a share of the trespasser’s net profits proportional to the physical
characteristics and size of the cave being commercially exploited); Raven Red Ash Coal Co.
v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231, 239 (Va. 1946) (awarding the market value of the excess use of an
existing right-of-way as an approximation of the money saved by a trespassing railway).
76. For more spontaneous and less bureaucratic creators, the mere need to obtain
permissions can poison the creative effort. See Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar,
supra note 74, at 90 (suggesting a special privilege for “context[s] where the use is not
ordinarily accompanied by pre-use negotiation or licensing”).
77. This no-harm result might follow even if the plaintiff is awarded an injunction. But
injunctions have dangers, such as giving a plaintiff “hold-out powers” that he or she can use
to squeeze the defendant. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 395–97
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 380–84 (1945)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
Note that in those cases where the defendant’s efforts produce something the
copyright owner disapproves of on ideological, religious, or dignitary grounds (e.g., a parody
of the plaintiff’s work), the fair use doctrine would continue to be available to shelter the
defendant, vel non, from liability.
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reaps any benefits at all, so as to facilitate bargaining between the parties.
But, in the artistic context, where so much depends on “following one’s
nose” and spontaneity,78 and where the boundaries of prior creators’ claims
are so indistinct,79 bargaining can be destructive. This is a kind of market
failure insufficiently recognized. Enforcing the plaintiff’s rights too
strongly may not result in bargaining, but in stalemate.80
The common law may provide a helpful rebuttal to the propertarians. I
know of no case where a harmless trespass for purposes of enjoyment
resulted in a substantial monetary judgment against the trespassers. Yet in
copyright, the statutory damage provision enables record companies to
collect thousands of dollars from teenagers involved in music copying even
where no harm is proved. If the teenagers were entering land or using
personalty for harmless enjoyment, as Andrew Kull has commented orally,
“it is virtually inconceivable that restitution law would have this effect.” In
trespass cases not involving significant commercial profit, only nominal
monetary payments are ordinarily recoverable.81
One might wonder, why are trespass-to-land suits for harmless
noncommercial entry ever brought? One purpose of the common law
allowing suits for such harmless entries is to provide a convenient way to
try title disputes (“that strip of land is mine,” “no, it’s mine”). I see such
nominal-damage suits not as determining that harmless entries are
“wrongful” but as an administrative convenience.82 I would allow titledetermination suits for copyright as well, but limit recovery to nominal
damages. The only copyright owners who would bring suits against this
kind of (largely profitless, noncommercial) harmless use would be people
who want clear titles against the possibility of some future harm occurring
at the defendant’s hands.
III. INTERIM CONCLUSION
One usually imagines that because real property is scarce, its legal rules
should be stricter against defendants than would be the rules governing
inexhaustible intangible property.83 If a harmless noncommercial entry to
land gives rise to no substantial recovery in restitution, then a fortiori, a
78. See Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar, supra note 74, at 83.
79. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273449.
80. Cf. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (exploring one set of reasons
why “rights to exclude” strangers from using creations and discoveries might retard the
innovation).
81. Although this phenomenon is observable (as a positive matter) and not stated as a
“rule” by any of the Restatements of Restitution, I believe it a principled statement of
(normative) law as well.
82. I think I read this proposition in something by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, but
cannot locate the source.
83. Of course, the supplies leading to the creation of intangibles are not inexhaustible.
That is one reason why I assume that many harmful erosions of copyright should remain
actionable.
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harmless noncommercial use of copyrighted works should give rise to no
monetary recovery either.84 Similarly, if the law of negligence provides
copyright a better model than does trespass-to-land, we need to remember
that negligence law generally forbids suits for carelessness that has caused
no harm.
In conclusion, let me sum up how my notion of owners’ obligations to
share might impact copyright’s treatment of harmless use. My thought
experiment suggests that copyright law should give more honor to harmless
uses—uses that produce results that are Pareto superior to nonuse. A rule
we should explore would thus look like the following: a copyright owner
cannot sue for substantially harmless uses except in two instances: (1) the
copyright owner should be able to obtain a monetary award and an
injunction85 where (a) the defendant makes a deliberate commercial use of
the authored work in a context where the defendant is making licensing and
other bureaucratic arrangements prior to production, and (b) the defendant
makes enough profit to remain whole after paying the plaintiff; or (2) the
copyright owner can obtain a nominal monetary award for purposes of
determining questions of title ownership and title, even against a harmless
use. Further, suits even for harmful copying would be potentially
defeasible (as to any remedy, or as to injunction alone) by a showing of dire
public need.86
In other words, I am one of those scholars distressed by copyright’s strict
and largely nonconditional trespass-like approach to liability.87 I suggest
84. There are other places where the law of real property is more generous to the public
than is copyright. Thus, for example, many states would give the public liberties to cross
over privately owned land if necessary to reach publicly owned resources such as beaches.
By contrast, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and at 28 U.S.C. § 4001),
incorporated into American copyright law, gives the public no liberty to decrypt a digitalmanagement-device even for the purpose of reaching publicly owned resources; if publicdomain materials are mixed with privately owned copyrighted works behind a digital gate,
the public has no general privilege to reach them. Similarly, although the fair use doctrine of
old-fashioned copyright law would allow a member of the public to reverse engineer a
copyrighted computer-program work in order to reach public domain material within it, the
DMCA has no general privilege of fair use. Thus, if reverse engineering required decrypting
a technological protection measure, American law would not permit it (unless the Copyright
Office issued a special ruling.) It is ironic when real property law is more generous to nonowners than is the law of intangibles. For more on this issue, see Wendy J. Gordon, Keynote
Address: Fair Use: Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903 (2005).
85. My remedial suggestions are the most tentative part of this essay. I have a healthy
suspicion of how injunctions can be abused, and the danger they pose to free speech, yet I
fear that monetary-only remedies can erode authors’ intrinsic motivations. Cf. Kwall, supra
note 62, at 2006–07.
86. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the common-law
doctrines of “private necessity” and “public necessity,” and Locke’s notion of charity.
87. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 55, at 1 (proposing, instead, “a test of ‘foreseeable
copying’ to limit copyright’s grant of exclusivity to situations where a copier’s use was
reasonably foreseeable to the creator at the time of creation”); Bohannan, supra note 55, at
974–76, 983–85 (criticizing the use of trespass-to-land models in copyright); Cristopher M.
Newman, Infringement as Nuisance (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
09-17, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354110. Another model of conditional
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that a new step be added to the copyright owner’s burden: she must prove
either that she has been harmed, or that she is suing simply to clarify title,
or that the defendant’s use is not the kind that would be substantively
impaired by a requirement of seeking prior permission. The last element
could be demonstrated, for example, by a showing that the defendant is a
commercial enterprise that made profitable use of the plaintiff’s work and
was engaged in making licensing and other bureaucratic arrangements prior
to and during the production process. If copyright were limited in these
ways, that might be a first step that might help our community to see more
clearly the next steps that must be taken to adapt current copyright to
humanitarian and democratic goals.
I offer this as a tentative, interim conclusion. Given the cooperative
nature of the copyright community, I look forward to learning what comes
next.

rather than strict liability is restitution. For an exploration of restitution as a model for
regulating the copying of intangibles see Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 33.

